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    	<title>CE Delft - Financi&#xEB;le instrumenten</title>
		<copyright>Copyright (c) 2012, CE Delft</copyright>
		<link>http://www.ce.nl/ce/rapporten/114/</link>
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		<language>nl</language>
		<description>CE Delft Rich Site Summary</description>
		<webMaster>webmaster@ce.nl (Webmaster)</webMaster>
		        
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			<title><![CDATA[Economic instruments for biodiversity]]></title>
			<link>http://www.ce.nl/publicatie/economic_instruments_for_biodiversity/1185</link>
			<guid>http://www.ce.nl/publicatie/economic_instruments_for_biodiversity/1185</guid>
			<description><![CDATA[The Dutch Taskforce on Biodiversity and Natural Resources has set up an Economic Instruments workgroup to assess how the recommendations of the TEEB report can be worked up into concrete Dutch policy measures. Based on that report and internal discussions, the workgroup has selected a series of issues for further study and elaboration. For these issues CE Delft was asked to design policy proposals that are both practicable and lead to better protection of biodiversity, not only in the Netherlands, but also by reducing the ecological footprint of Dutch consumption patterns in other countries.

The following proposals have been investigated and/or elaborated in policy terms:

    lowering the social discount rate
    further greening of the tax system
    an import charge on bulk commodities
    a tax on non-sustainable timber
    a tax on development of greenfield sites
    a differentiated tax on animal protein
    a review of incentive schemes for biomass projects&amp;nbsp;
]]></description>
			<pubDate>Tue, 04 Oct 2011 13:12:58 +0200</pubDate>
			<category>Algemeen</category>
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			<title><![CDATA[Taxes on energy products, electricity and CO2]]></title>
			<link>http://www.ce.nl/publicatie/taxes_on_energy_products%2C_electricity_and_co2/1182</link>
			<guid>http://www.ce.nl/publicatie/taxes_on_energy_products%2C_electricity_and_co2/1182</guid>
			<description><![CDATA[This report, formally despatched to the Dutch Parliament by the Ministry of Finance and Ministry of Infrastructure and the Environment in September 2011, &amp;nbsp;compares taxes on energy products, electricity and CO2 emissions in nine EU member states (Germany, Belgium, Denmark, the United Kingdom, France, Luxemburg, Spain, Sweden and the Netherlands) and the fiscal, economic and environmental consequences of the review of the European Energy Tax Directive for the Netherlands. It was prepared jointly by CE Delft and Ecofys.]]></description>
			<pubDate>Tue, 20 Sep 2011 16:30:05 +0200</pubDate>
			<category>Algemeen</category>
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			<title><![CDATA[Government intervention in the energy market]]></title>
			<link>http://www.ce.nl/publicatie/government_intervention_in_the_energy_market/1178</link>
			<guid>http://www.ce.nl/publicatie/government_intervention_in_the_energy_market/1178</guid>
			<description><![CDATA[In this study, conducted jointly by Ecofys and CE Delft and commissioned by Eneco and Triodos Bank, government interventions in the Dutch energy market were inventoried under the guidance of a group of leading economists and energy experts. The consequences of these interventions for the playing field for fossil fuels, renewables, nuclear power and energy efficiency were then quantified. The results show that, by design or unintentionally, the Dutch government continues to provide greater incentives for energy consumption and use of fossil fuels than for renewable energy sources. Policies aimed at reducing the price differential between renewable and fossil-based electricity should therefore seek to phase out such support and only then address the residual &amp;lsquo;financial gap&amp;rsquo;.

On June 22nd the report was presented to MPs Liesbeth van Tongeren (Green Left) and Rene Leegte (Liberals) by the respective directors of CE Delft and Ecofys, Frans Rooijers and Manon Janssen.

Supplementary data, October 2011
This report has been revised to accommodate several comments received since original publication in June 2011:

    
        
            1.	
            Tax credit for investments in marginal gas fields on the Dutch continental shelf&amp;nbsp;	
        
        
            &amp;nbsp;
            
            
                Changed from &amp;euro; 196 mln to zero
                As yet, no use has been made of this scheme for 2010
            
            
        
        
            2.	
            Various multi-year subsidies for Carbon Capture and Storage (CCS)&amp;nbsp;&amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp;&amp;nbsp;	
        
        
            &amp;nbsp;
            
            
                Changed from &amp;euro; 150 mln to &amp;euro; 15.3 mln (budgeted cash outlay according to cabinet letter to parliament)
                The &amp;euro; 150 mln subsidy made available for the ROAD project in 2010 cannot be fully allocated to that year
            
            
        
        
            3.	
            Buy-off of eight companies' EU ETS emission credits by the State of the Netherlands
        
        
            &amp;nbsp;
            
            
                Changed from &amp;euro; 56 mln to zero
                This scheme only comes into force in 2013
            
            
        
        
            4.
            Free EU ETS emission credits, 2005-2012
        
        
            &amp;nbsp;
            
            
                Changed from &amp;euro; 1.0 bln to 1.2 bln
                The June 2011 report was based on the situation in the year 2020. This was because the EU had already announced its intention to address this indirect subsidy by auctioning a higher proportion of the credits. For the same reason, calculations were based on an emissions trading price of &amp;euro; 30/tCO2. We have now brought this assumption into line with the actual situation in 2010, taking a trading price of &amp;euro;14.3/tCO2 and free credits for 84Mt of emissions.
            
            
        
    

Needless to say, the total figures cited in the report as well as the summary have also been revised accordingly. The new versions can now be downloaded from this page.]]></description>
			<pubDate>Fri, 26 Aug 2011 13:32:20 +0200</pubDate>
			<category>Algemeen</category>
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			<title><![CDATA[Will the energy-intensive industry profit from EU ETS under Phase 3?]]></title>
			<link>http://www.ce.nl/publicatie/will_the_energy-intensive_industry_profit_from_eu_ets_under_phase_3/1097</link>
			<guid>http://www.ce.nl/publicatie/will_the_energy-intensive_industry_profit_from_eu_ets_under_phase_3/1097</guid>
			<description><![CDATA[This study addresses the question whether the new EU ETS allocation mechanism to be introduced in 2013 will alter the scope for energy-intensive companies to pass through the costs of freely obtained allowances and obtain additional profits. Recent empirical research by CE Delft has indicated that it is not only power generators but also energy-intensive industries that have passed through the costs of their EU emission allowances in product prices. As they obtained these emission rights for free, they may have made a windfall profit during the first two phases of the EU ETS. In the third phase, starting in 2013, more rights are to be auctioned, however, and benchmarks introduced.

This study establishes that under this new system firms will have even more incentives to obtain windfall profits. For the marginal firm, energy costs will rise substantial owing to the auctioning of emission rights in excess of the benchmarks. This will put upward pressure on price levels in EU product markets. Cost pass-through and windfall profits are therefore likely to continue even after 2013.
&amp;nbsp;]]></description>
			<pubDate>Thu, 23 Dec 2010 04:07:16 +0100</pubDate>
			<category>Algemeen</category>
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			<title><![CDATA[The environmental impact of the Dutch packaging tax]]></title>
			<link>http://www.ce.nl/publicatie/the_environmental_impact_of_the_dutch_packaging_tax/1102</link>
			<guid>http://www.ce.nl/publicatie/the_environmental_impact_of_the_dutch_packaging_tax/1102</guid>
			<description><![CDATA[At the request of the Dutch Finance ministry, CE Delft has reviewed the environmental impact of the Netherlands&amp;rsquo; packaging tax. This tax is indexed to greenhouse gas emissions and the review was aimed specifically at assessing the climate impact of the tax. Given the brief history of the tax at the time of writing and the fact that the available data on packaging volumes and composition before and after introduction of the tax were not comparable, it emerged that a reliable quantitative analysis was as yet unfeasible. This review is therefore based on a qualitative analysis, using information derived from eighteen in-depth interviews with players in the packaging market, foreign experience in this area, relevant price elasticities and expert estimates.

The picture to emerge from this review is that to data the packaging tax has had only a limited impact on the packaging market. Although the interviewees cited several examples of industries and sectors where the tax has given companies an incentive to modify their packaging strategy, in their view this is not (yet) the case for the majority of companies. In the longer term (ten years or so) more substantial effects are anticipated, but in the view of those interviewed these will remain limited. The following reasons were cited for the limited effects (in both the short and long term): the limited financial incentive provided by the tax, the fact that corporate packaging strategies are determined by other factors besides costs, the highly international nature of the packaging market, and the lack of a stable policy framework. The environmental impact of the packaging tax would be greatly amplified if the rates were substantially increased.]]></description>
			<pubDate>Tue, 19 Oct 2010 15:30:27 +0200</pubDate>
			<category>Algemeen</category>
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			<title><![CDATA[Dutch Energy Efficiency Benchmarking Covenant: Results and energy tax exemptions]]></title>
			<link>http://www.ce.nl/publicatie/dutch_energy_efficiency_benchmarking_covenant%3A_results_and_energy_tax_exemptions/1072</link>
			<guid>http://www.ce.nl/publicatie/dutch_energy_efficiency_benchmarking_covenant%3A_results_and_energy_tax_exemptions/1072</guid>
			<description><![CDATA[Energy-intensive companies in the Netherlands have made too little progress in recent years on improving their energy performance, while at same time enjoying a reduced Energy Tax rate. A study by CE Delft on the impact of the Energy Efficiency Benchmarking Covenant shows that between 1999 and 2007 energy-intensive industries improved their efficiency by only half a percent per annum. In certain sectors like refineries, primary metals and chemicals, energy savings were in fact lower than to be expected on the basis of autonomous trends (without the Covenant).

When this negotiated agreement came into force, energy efficiency was on average 3.7% better than &amp;lsquo;World Best&amp;rsquo;, while in 2012 it is anticipated to be 0.7% worse. &amp;lsquo;World Best&amp;rsquo; is defined in the Covenant as the 10% most energy-efficient companies in the world. The study was carried out for the Netherlands Society for Nature and Environment (Stichting Natuur en Milieu).
&amp;nbsp;]]></description>
			<pubDate>Tue, 13 Jul 2010 09:59:21 +0200</pubDate>
			<category>Algemeen</category>
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			<title><![CDATA[An energy tax benchmark for greenhouse horticulture]]></title>
			<link>http://www.ce.nl/publicatie/an_energy_tax_benchmark_for_greenhouse_horticulture/1053</link>
			<guid>http://www.ce.nl/publicatie/an_energy_tax_benchmark_for_greenhouse_horticulture/1053</guid>
			<description><![CDATA[With its energy-intensive and at the same time small-scale operations, Dutch greenhouse horticulture is held to be subject to disproportionately high Energy Tax rates. As a compensatory measure a so-called agricultural tariff was introduced a number of years ago, i.e. a lower tax rate on gas consumption specifically for horticulture. The question of whether this tariff can and should be extended for a further period is now on the table, because approval for 2011 and 2012 is soon to be sought from the European Commission in Brussels. To this end a better understanding is required of the energy intensity of the greenhouse horticulture sector and the tax burden of the Energy Tax in comparison with other energy-intensive sectors of the Dutch economy.
At the request of the Dutch Horticultural Product Board and the Ministry of Agriculture, Nature and Food Quality,&amp;nbsp; CE Delft and the Agricultural Economics Research Institute (LEI) have compared the energy costs and Energy Tax burden of the greenhouse horticulture sector with those of industrial sectors. The aim of the study was twofold:&amp;nbsp;

    To provide insight into the energy costs and energy tax burden of greenhouse horticulture compared with industrial sectors.
    To identify promising feedback mechanisms that would permit abolition of the lower tariff for greenhouse horticulture.

Conclusions
A comparison with industry shows that greenhouse horticulture is one of the most energy-intensive sectors of the Dutch economy, paying markedly more Energy Tax per unit turnover than industry. This holds whether the agricultural tariff or the general tariff is paid. Because of the small-scale nature of greenhouse horticulture, the Energy Tax paid on natural gas (with limited consumption in the cheaper tax bands) makes up a relatively high proportion of operating costs. As a result, a higher Energy Tax rate may have a greater impact on the competitiveness of greenhouse horticulture compared with industry. This confirms that the rationale behind initial introduction of the agricultural tariff is still valid.
Although various feedback mechanisms are theoretically conceivable to compensate for the increased outlay if the agricultural tariff is abolished, implementation will not be straightforward. With some of the options (feedback via income tax and corporation tax) the potential for adequate compensation of the increased tax burden for greenhouse horticulture is problematical. Serious consideration should be given to feedback options based on energy efficiency subsidies and a CO2 benchmark. Further study on these issues is required.&amp;nbsp;]]></description>
			<pubDate>Mon, 14 Jun 2010 12:48:37 +0200</pubDate>
			<category>Algemeen</category>
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			<title><![CDATA[Renewable electricity: subsidised or compulsory?]]></title>
			<link>http://www.ce.nl/publicatie/renewable_electricity%3A_subsidised_or_compulsory/1085</link>
			<guid>http://www.ce.nl/publicatie/renewable_electricity%3A_subsidised_or_compulsory/1085</guid>
			<description><![CDATA[European nations employ a range of instruments to encourage investments in renewable energy. In broad terms, two main types of policy can be distinguished: subsidy schemes and arrangements obliging power suppliers to generate a specified fraction of their output from renewable sources (&amp;ldquo;mandatory renewable energy targets&amp;rdquo;). In the Netherlands the SDE renewable energy incentive scheme is employed to this end. This study examines whether mandatory renewable energy target are:

    A&amp;nbsp;more cost-effective and efficient way of securing the government&amp;rsquo;s near-term renewable electricity target (up to 2020).
    A&amp;nbsp;better means of creating a stable investment climate and thus a structural market for renewable electricity with an eye to the long-term energy transition, i.e. beyond 2020.

To answer these questions, renewable energy incentive schemes were assessed in the Netherlands, Denmark, Germany and Spain (all with subsidies) and Belgium, Poland, the United Kingdom and Sweden (all with mandatory targets).

The report concludes that there are at present no clear indications that mandatory targets are more cost-effective than subsidisation as long as the share of renewable electricity is still limited (up to 2020). To support the longer-term energy transition, however, from 2015 onwards mandatory targets will need to be gradually introduced as a means of achieving a timely shift in investments from conventional to renewable sources, essential for the envisaged transition. How mandatory targets can best be introduced in the Netherlands is an issue requiring further study.

The present study was commissioned by the Dutch Association for Energy Markets (VME).]]></description>
			<pubDate>Mon, 23 Aug 2010 10:07:51 +0200</pubDate>
			<category>Algemeen</category>
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			<title><![CDATA[Working together towards green urban distribution ]]></title>
			<link>http://www.ce.nl/publicatie/working_together_towards_green_urban_distribution_/1055</link>
			<guid>http://www.ce.nl/publicatie/working_together_towards_green_urban_distribution_/1055</guid>
			<description><![CDATA[Green urban distribution systems are seen by many entrepreneurs and government agencies as a promising solution for a range of problems. This is the abstract picture that emerges from this new exploration of the opportunities and obstacles in the field of urban distribution.

Green urban distribution holds promise if it can be embedded in existing or relatively logical distribution lines. In market terms the creation of entirely new lines, possibly combined with roll-out of new infrastructure or entirely novel distribution concepts, is less promising. The reasons for this are varied in nature, but can be summed up in three terms: policy issues, communication and infrastructure.

The obstacles identified immediately beg the question: What can be done? The first thing that needs to be done is to elaborate dedicated policies addressing a number of key issues, which means combining the know-how and resources available in various tiers and agencies of government, at the same time forging alliances with the key partners in the field, i.e. producers, retailers, distributors and so on.
The conclusions in brief:&amp;nbsp;&amp;nbsp;

    Although harder to implement, novel concepts are more promising.
    Entrepreneurs and government differ in their expectations.
    In many municipalities no policy framework exists.
    Where there is a policy framework (in Utrecht and, recently, Amsterdam) the initiatives dovetail better with policy and vice versa.
    Transparency and clarity on subsidies is desirable.
    Enforcement of environmental zones and so on is essential.
    Cooperation among all parties is also essential.

The recommendations for entrepreneurs in brief:

    Start by doing what you&amp;rsquo;re good at.
    Examine whether your concept really offers &amp;lsquo;added value&amp;rsquo; for society as a whole.
    Select the municipality where your concept can be dovetailed in and will be supported.
    Seek collaboration with other entrepreneurs, and involve retailers and street managers.
    Communicate your plans transparently, certainly in terms of planning.

The recommendations for (local) government in brief:

    Listen hard and learn from the initiatives.
    Create frameworks within which initiatives can develop.
    Examine whether the initiatives contribute to achieving the policy targets.
    Show what is going on in your municipality and what the benefits are.
    Waste no time in deciding whether you wish to and are able to support particular initiatives and communicate your choice clearly.
]]></description>
			<pubDate>Tue, 15 Jun 2010 09:22:51 +0200</pubDate>
			<category>Algemeen</category>
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			<title><![CDATA[Cost allocation under the EU ETS]]></title>
			<link>http://www.ce.nl/publicatie/cost_allocation_under_the_eu_ets/1064</link>
			<guid>http://www.ce.nl/publicatie/cost_allocation_under_the_eu_ets/1064</guid>
			<description><![CDATA[After 2012, the third Phase of the EU Emissions Trading Scheme (EU ETS) comes into place that lasts until 2020. New to this system is the European harmonized allocation of rights. In addition, a larger part of the rights will be auctioned. For the Netherlands the third Phase of EU ETS implies that emissions of companies under the EU ETS have to be reduced by 21% compared to 2005. This results in cost increases. Companies have to reduce their emissions by means of investing in technical measures or buy allowances on the market. Also the cost of inputs may rise, such as electricity used in production processes.

This study, commissioned by the Ministry of Finance, addresses the question who in the end will pay for these higher costs: is that consumers, governments or businesses? This study focuses primarily on direct costs. Indirect effects and costs (such as changes in sales, employment or income from the corporation for the government) are not included in this study. The study takes a quantitative stand in assessing these costs using econometric and statistical techniques.
The analyses in this study show that CO2 emissions of Dutch plants under the EU ETS are expected to decrease to 68 Mton in 2020. About half of the 68 Mton rights that will be allocated in 2020 will be auctioned&amp;nbsp;- the other half will be distributed for free. Auctioning takes place almost exclusively for electricity generation. Only 2% of industrial emissions are expected to fall under an auction regime, especially in some subsectors of the food industry and the paper industry.]]></description>
			<pubDate>Thu, 04 Nov 2010 12:58:43 +0100</pubDate>
			<category>Algemeen</category>
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			<title><![CDATA[Limits to green? Greening tax system in the Netherlands]]></title>
			<link>http://www.ce.nl/publicatie/limits_to_green_greening_tax_system_in_the_netherlands/1026</link>
			<guid>http://www.ce.nl/publicatie/limits_to_green_greening_tax_system_in_the_netherlands/1026</guid>
			<description><![CDATA[The central issue considered in this report is the extent to which a further extension of environmental taxation can contribute to building a sustainable economy. In the context of the present study, a sustainable economy is taken to mean that the risks associated with climate change and resource depletion are reduced to an acceptable level by 2050.

One strategy towards achieving this aim could comprise the following key elements:&amp;nbsp;&amp;nbsp;

    Introduction of a new carbon tax as part of the Energy Tax.
    A broadening of the scope of the Energy Tax to include sectors like agriculture and industry and removal of other fiscal subsidies and reduced rates.
    Extension of the tax system to include new taxes on the import/production of natural resources (timber, fish, meat) and land use.
    A European agenda on green tax reform.

The proposed &amp;lsquo;additional greening&amp;rsquo; package comprises:

    An increase in the duty on motor fuels combined with the proposed carbon tax (average overall increase in tax on motor fuels: 20%).
    Abolition of Energy Tax reductions for business and industry by setting the second and third tier rates equal to the first, combined with subsidies for energy conservation.
    On top of the existing Energy Tax, introduction of a CO2 indexed component of 50%, to induce further energy-saving and introduce differentiation with respect to the carbon content of the various energy sources.
    Introduction of a tax on meat or animal feed that ensures that the harmful impacts of meat consumption, many of them outside the Netherlands, are passed on to Dutch consumers.
    Abolition of tax breaks such as that in force for &amp;lsquo;red diesel&amp;rsquo; and reduced Energy Tax rates for greenhouse horticulture and industry.
    Introduction of a tax on &amp;lsquo;green-field&amp;rsquo; land development.

Tax revenues
With the ambitious package of environmental taxes outlined, a 20% share of green tax revenue is feasible in the Netherlands, equivalent to 5% of the country&amp;rsquo;s Gross Domestic Product. This figure of 5% is in line with what international studies anticipate as being the fiscal limits of a green tax system. For this level of greening, Euro-pean coordination is not essential. In calculating the figure of 20% green tax revenue, due allowance has been made for the fact that reduced pollution will lead to declining tax revenues. Expectations are that this package will make a major contribution to achieving the government&amp;rsquo;s environmental and climate targets, particularly the latter. With this package, an additional greening of around &amp;euro; 8 billion can be achieved over and above existing green revenues of some &amp;euro; 19 billion. The share of green taxes would then rise from 14% today to around 20%. These revenues can be recycled in the form of lower taxes on corporate profits or labour, with the additional option of using some fraction to incentivise further energy-saving by selected target groups.]]></description>
			<pubDate>Tue, 22 Feb 2011 09:33:14 +0100</pubDate>
			<category>Algemeen</category>
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			<title><![CDATA[The impact of particle-filter differentiation of the kilometre charge on PM10 emissions ]]></title>
			<link>http://www.ce.nl/publicatie/the_impact_of_particle-filter_differentiation_of_the_kilometre_charge_on_pm10_emissions_/1003</link>
			<guid>http://www.ce.nl/publicatie/the_impact_of_particle-filter_differentiation_of_the_kilometre_charge_on_pm10_emissions_/1003</guid>
			<description><![CDATA[The Netherlands intends to introduce a road pricing scheme and the Dutch Ministry of Housing, Spatial Planning and the Environment (VROM) asked CE Delft to assess the impact on particle emissions of varying the kilometre charge according to whether or not vehicles are fitted with a particle filter. The scheme was conceptualised as a penalty/discount system, with diesel cars lacking an ex-works particle filter subject to a penalty of 2.5 Euro cents on top of the standard kilometre tariff and other vehicles being eligible for a discount. The level of this discount was designed such that the kilometre charge remains cost-neutral for motorists. 

The effects of particle-filter differentiation of the kilometre charge were estimated&amp;nbsp; using the elasticities reported in the scientific literature. This yielded a projected reduction in PM10 emissions of between 0.01 and 0.06 kt in 2020, or 1 to 7% of the total particulate emissions of passenger cars. There would be a similar percentage reduction in PM2.5 emissions. 

The focus in this study was on particulate emission cuts in the year 2020, rather than in the intervening years. The environmental impact in those intervening years is anticipated to be even greater, given that during this period the fleet will have an even greater proportion of diesel vehicles without a filter. After 2020 the impact of particle-filter differentiation of the kilometre change will decrease. Further study could chart the course of the effectiveness of the measure over time. ]]></description>
			<pubDate>Wed, 10 Mar 2010 07:46:23 +0100</pubDate>
			<category>Algemeen</category>
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			<title><![CDATA[Profitability of cogeneration ]]></title>
			<link>http://www.ce.nl/publicatie/profitability_of_cogeneration_/981</link>
			<guid>http://www.ce.nl/publicatie/profitability_of_cogeneration_/981</guid>
			<description><![CDATA[In a communication dated 23 February, 2009 (28665, no. 100) the Dutch Ministry of Economic Affairs stated that new-build cogeneration plant in the Netherlands can in almost all instances compete with other types of generating capacity and consequently require no financial support from the government. In underpinning this conclusion, the ministry used data calculated by the Netherlands Energy Research Centre, ECN, in a report entitled (in translation) &amp;lsquo;Price differential calculations for new cogeneration capacity, 2009&amp;rsquo;. A number of sectors operating cogeneration facilities have protested at the ministry&amp;rsquo;s conclusion and the decision not to introduce a subsidy for new-build capacity.

Further to a parliamentary motion by Vendrik and Zijlstra (no. 31239/44), CE Delft has been commissioned to give a second opinion on the model used and the ECN data as well as the route by which the ministry has arrived at the conclusion that (virtually) all categories of cogeneration can be profitably operated.]]></description>
			<pubDate>Wed, 10 Mar 2010 07:48:51 +0100</pubDate>
			<category>Algemeen</category>
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			<title><![CDATA[Economic instruments for biodiversity]]></title>
			<link>http://www.ce.nl/publicatie/economic_instruments_for_biodiversity/883</link>
			<guid>http://www.ce.nl/publicatie/economic_instruments_for_biodiversity/883</guid>
			<description><![CDATA[Over the years, biodiversity worldwide has been rapidly declining. Without new policies, we risk irreversibly damaging the natural resource base necessary to support economic growth and well-being. What European policies are needed to address the growing European footprint? How can European Member states best work together to tackle these challenges? 

One promising policy option is to set up an European Biodiversity Trading System (EU BTS). This would imply that high-impact land use change activities are &amp;lsquo;taxed&amp;rsquo; for their development activities through a requirement to compensate for all unavoidable impacts on biodiversity. Companies or sectors under the trading system need to buy biodiversity debits to cover their ecological footprint, which is determined by the quantity and quality of their land utilization. In this way, revenues are collected to finance biodiversity offsets. These offsets are supplied by (developing) counties that undertake additional efforts to preserve their valuable and threatened ecosystems.

This research report provides an analysis of some crucial policy options regarding biodiversity trade mechanisms on the European level. It is commissioned by the Dutch Ministry of Housing, Spatial Planning and Environment.]]></description>
			<pubDate>Tue, 17 Mar 2009 10:17:35 +0100</pubDate>
			<category>Algemeen</category>
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			<title><![CDATA[Vision on achieving a major share of renewables]]></title>
			<link>http://www.ce.nl/publicatie/vision_on_achieving_a_major_share_of_renewables/892</link>
			<guid>http://www.ce.nl/publicatie/vision_on_achieving_a_major_share_of_renewables/892</guid>
			<description><![CDATA[This report contains the joint recommendations of environmental NGOs, trades unions and energy companies for a future stimulus package for renewable electricity. What all these parties would like to see is a major role for renewable power by the year 2020. The recommendations have been underwritten by the Netherlands Society for Nature and Environment (Stichting Natuur and Milieu), Energy Ned, Nuon, Esent, Eneco, Greenchoice, Greenpeace, the Dutch umbrella organisation on renewable energy and the trades union ABVAKABO FNV, and were facilitated by CE Delft. The resultant document represents a bridge between Green4sure &amp;ndash; the energy plan put forward by the environmental NGOs and trades unions &amp;ndash; and the Energy Agenda 2030 proposed by the energy sector.

The parties argue for a stable set of market instruments to structurally bridge the gap in cost price between renewable and conventional electricity. In 2020 renewable technologies will still be more expensive than their conventional counterparts. Although the current &amp;lsquo;SDE&amp;rsquo; scheme forms a good policy tool for bridging this cost-price differential (the so-called &amp;lsquo;inefficient top&amp;rsquo;) in the coming years, it needs to be improved in two important ways. In the first place it is essential that long-term political commitment be formally laid down for the investments associated with securing the targets. The second area requiring improvement according to the parties is that the funding mechanism for the SDE should be via the electricity price rather than coming from the national budget. 

To stimulate renewable energy production from 2015 onwards, the organisations argue for introduction of an EU-wide commitment by a &amp;lsquo;frontrunner group&amp;rsquo;, possibly including the UK, Poland, Sweden and Belgium. The aim of such a move would be to introduce an &amp;lsquo;escalator&amp;rsquo; under which member states are obliged to annually increase the share of renewables used in meeting national electricity demand. Such a scheme would be tied to a number of solid conditions, including a well-functioning system of &amp;lsquo;green certificates&amp;rsquo; for use among participating countries.]]></description>
			<pubDate>Tue, 24 Mar 2009 10:22:10 +0100</pubDate>
			<category>Algemeen</category>
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			<title><![CDATA[Analysis of progressive road vehicle tax indexed to absolute CO2]]></title>
			<link>http://www.ce.nl/publicatie/analysis_of_progressive_road_vehicle_tax_indexed_to_absolute_co2/906</link>
			<guid>http://www.ce.nl/publicatie/analysis_of_progressive_road_vehicle_tax_indexed_to_absolute_co2/906</guid>
			<description><![CDATA[At the request of the Dutch Finance Ministry, CE Delft has investigated the CO2 impact of redesigning the vehicle tax for passenger cars (BPM) from being based on catalogue value, as at present, the CO2 based system whereby the CO2 charge is progressively indexed to the CO2 emissions of the new vehicle. This variant was compared with the effectiveness of the two BPM variants from the study on &amp;lsquo;greening the Dutch tax system&amp;rsquo; (differentiation of BPM according to absolute CO2 emission and BPM based on CO2) and the current BPM based on energy labels (rates for 2008).]]></description>
			<pubDate>Fri, 04 Dec 2009 14:13:26 +0100</pubDate>
			<category>Algemeen</category>
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			<title><![CDATA[Energy conservation: fiscal and financial options]]></title>
			<link>http://www.ce.nl/publicatie/energy_conservation%3A_fiscal_and_financial_options/493</link>
			<guid>http://www.ce.nl/publicatie/energy_conservation%3A_fiscal_and_financial_options/493</guid>
			<description><![CDATA[This report, commissioned by the Dutch environment ministry following a parliamentary motion on the issue, examines fiscal and financial options for energy saving in the built environment. Such measures can be designed to tie in with Energy Performance certification for dwellings and other buildings, scheduled for introduction in mid-2007.

The conclusions are as follows:The envisaged annual rate of energy conservation in the built environment (1.3% as of 2008, 1.5% as of 2012) cannot be achieved with the policies in place today; perhaps worse, these policies fail to tap into many of the options with a pay-back of less than 4 to 6 years.To increase the tempo of energy savings, overcome resistance and instil a sense of urgency requires policies that oblige parties to improve the energy performance of their entire building stock.Fiscal and financial instruments can be designed to specifically address the remaining barriers and instances of market failure. This means an array of dedicated measures targeting the following groups:
Private housing: A discount on property transfer tax may be an effective instrument, particularly because of the scope for tying in with renovation work. After all, property sale is often taken as a natural opportunity for structural renovations like insulation or purchase of energy-efficient equipment and appliances.Social housing: Greater weight should be given to energy efficiency in housing valuation procedures, to give housing corporations greater flexibility to ask more rent for low-energy dwellings, which occupants can then compensate with the lower energy bill. Experience has shown that renovation projects provide substantial scope for CO2 cuts without a need for any increase in overall gross monthly rent (i.e. inclusive of energy costs).Utility buildings: Energy conservation agencies can develop new funding modes and administrative structures that allow owners to make a better job of weighing up the costs and benefits of conservation measures. A key problem in the utility sector is that owner-investors have nothing to gain from their investments, through a lower energy bill or greater comfort; there is thus a split incentive. 
]]></description>
			<pubDate>Tue, 17 Mar 2009 10:17:35 +0100</pubDate>
			<category>Algemeen</category>
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